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Background: Decentralisation is argued to promote community participation, accountability, technical efficiency, and
equity in the management of resources, and has been a recurring theme in health system reforms for several
decades. In 2010, Kenya passed a new constitution that introduced 47 semi-autonomous county governments,
with substantial transfer of responsibility for health service delivery from the central government to these counties.
Focusing on two key elements of the health system, Human Resources for Health (HRH) and Essential Medicines and
Medical Supplies (EMMS) management, we analysed the early implementation experiences of this major governance
reform at county level.
Methods: We employed a qualitative case study design, focusing on Kilifi County, and adapted the decision space
framework developed by Bossert et al., to guide our inquiry and analysis. Data were collected through document
reviews, key informant interviews, and participant and non-participant observations between December 2012 and
December 2014.
Results: As with other county level functions, HRH and EMMS management functions were rapidly transferred to
counties before appropriate county-level structures and adequate capacity to undertake these functions were in
place. For HRH, this led to major disruptions in staff salary payments, political interference with HRH management
functions and confusion over HRH management roles. There was also lack of clarity over specific roles and responsibilities
at county and national government, and of key players at each level. Subsequently health worker strikes and mass
resignations were witnessed. With EMMS, significant delays in procurement led to long stock-outs of essential
drugs in health facilities. However, when the county finally managed to procure drugs, health facilities reported a
better order fill-rate compared to the period prior to devolution.
Conclusion: The devolved government system in Kenya has significantly increased county level decision-space
for HRH and EMMS management functions. However, harnessing the full potential benefits of this increased
autonomy requires targeted interventions to clarify the roles and responsibilities of different actors at all levels of
the new system, and to build capacity of the counties to undertake certain specific HRH and EMMS management
tasks. Capacity considerations should always be central when designing health sector decentralisation policies.
Keywords: Decentralisation, Devolution, Governance, Health workforce management, Commodities management* Correspondence: Btsofa@kemri-wellcome.org
1KEMRI Wellcome Trust Research Programme, KEMRI Centre for Geographic
Medicine Research Coast, P.O. Box 230-80108, Kilifi, Kenya
2Global Health Department, Faculty of Public Health and Policy London
School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, London, UK
Full list of author information is available at the end of the article
© The Author(s). 2017 Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to
the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made. The Creative Commons Public Domain Dedication waiver
(http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/) applies to the data made available in this article, unless otherwise stated.
Tsofa et al. International Journal for Equity in Health  (2017) 16:169 Page 2 of 13Background
Decentralisation is argued to promote community par-
ticipation and accountability, and enhance technical
efficiency and equity in the management of public re-
sources. Within the health sector, decentralisation has
been a recurring theme in health system reforms for se-
veral decades [1, 2]. The implementation of decentralisa-
tion polices within the health sector has adopted a wide
range of modes and forms, determined by the nature
and structure of the sub-national level entity to which
responsibility is transferred. However, irrespective of the
form, the final effects of decentralisation reforms have
been influenced by many internal and external factors
including the reasons or drivers for decentralisation, and
the country’s political context [1, 3–6]. In practice
decentralization involves shifting power and authority
over the management of public resources from national to
sub-national levels of government. This makes it a highly
political reform, though its political nature and context
are rarely analyzed in empirical studies [1, 4, 7, 8].
Human Resources for Health (HRH) and Essential
Medicines and Medical Supplies (EMMS) are two critical
building blocks of health systems. Considering that the
two attract a substantial amount of total health system
funding, they often generate contention during the design
and implementation of health sector decentralization
policies [2, 9]. However, even with the acknowledgement
of the central role of HRH and EMMS, decentralization
policy formation and debate mainly focuses on financial
resource allocation, financial management and report-
ing, with HRH and EMMS management plans rarely
featuring [2, 10].
In June 2015, we carried out a systematic search of pub-
lished empirical studies on the effects of decentralization
on HRH and EMMS management in LMICs, published in
English language between 1983 and December 2014 which
identified 14 articles on HRH, and 7 on EMMS. The
studies described a wide range of both positive and
negative effects on HRH and EMMS management in
LMICs. On HRH management, several studies reported
decentralization being associated with better attraction
and retention of lower cadre staff, but poor attraction of
specialized health workers [11–15]. In Tanzania for ex-
ample, after undertaking decentralization for all HRH
management functions to the district level, rural districts
were unable to attract and retain highly skilled staff such
as medical specialists, leading the country to re-centralize
some of the HRH management functions [12, 16]. Some
studies suggested that certain HRH management func-
tions, including recruitment and distribution of highly
specialized health workers, in-service training, and
management of staff salaries, are best managed cen-
trally [11–13, 17]; while other functions like staff ap-
praisals, promotions, recruitment and deployment oflower cadre health workers are best handled in decen-
tralized units [12, 14]. Another commonly reported
HRH management problem linked with decentralization
has been frequent delays and disruptions in payments of
staff salaries; and challenges in managing in-service train-
ing and other career progression initiatives [12, 14, 18]. In
addition, several studies identified challenges in the ma-
nagement of the responsibility transfer process from cen-
tral level to decentralized units, in the early stages of
decentralization. This has often been associated with con-
fusion, fear and anxiety on the part of health workers. In
many instances, these HRH management challenges have
resulted in low staff morale, industrial action like strikes
and mass resignations [12, 13].
On EMMS management, the literature shows that
many countries with decentralized health systems
retained most EMMS management functions under cen-
tral control. In most cases it was argued that the central
level had better capacity to undertake quantification of
EMMS, obtain economies of scale associated with bulk
purchases, and monitor and reinforce quality of drugs
and commodities supplied [10, 11, 17]. However, where
EMMS management was decentralized, there was been
some documentation of better budgetary allocation for
commodities, leading to better servicing of commodity
[19] orders at facility level, for example in Ghana and
Guantemala [10].
As part of the implementation of the 2010 constitu-
tion, the Government of Kenya in 2013 adopted a de-
volved government system with 47 semi-autonomous
county governments, with significant decision making
autonomy, and minimal central level control [20–22].
The design and implementation process of the devolved
government system was largely driven by a political push
to address real and perceived long-term political chal-
lenges of marginalization and inequitable resource allo-
cation in the country [19, 23]. Within the health sector,
the constitution outlined that all health service delivery
functions, including the procurement of EMMS and
management of HRH, would be assigned to county go-
vernments, while the national Ministry of Health (MoH)
was assigned the roles of health policy and standards
formulation, pre-service training for health workers, and
management of national referral services. A detailed
breakdown of the functions assigned to national and
county governments is found in the schedule 4 of the
constitution [20].
The constitution outlined a five-year plan for estab-
lishing county government structures and progressive
transfer of functions. This was to begin with the estab-
lishment and capacity building of county level structures
between 2010 and 2013, and progressive transfer of
functions over a 3 year period from 2013 [20], facilitated
by a Transition Authority [24] (Tsofa B, et al.: How does
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cial management? A case study of early effects of devo-
lution in Kilifi County, Kenya, submited). However, once
they were elected into office in early 2013, the county
governors began to agitate for an immediate transfer of
all county level functions. The president in June 2013
succumbed to the pressure from the governors and di-
rected that all county functions be devolved immedi-
ately, though at that time most counties had not
established structures to undertake these functions
(Tsofa B, et al.: How does decentralisation affect health
sector planning and financial management? A case study
of early effects of devolution in Kilifi County, Kenya,
submited) [25].
Kenya thus provides an ongoing opportunity to exa-
mine devolution of these key health sector management
functions of HRH and EMMS. In addition to contribu-
ting to the literature on decentralization effects on HRH
and EMMS management, this paper uniquely analyses
the broader political context within which the devolu-
tion reform was implemented, and analyses health sector
devolution effects as they played out during the process
of implementation.Methods
This paper presents data from a broader health systems
governance study that has been analyzing the effects of
implementation of devolution of the health system in
Kenya [21, 25, 26]. The study established a health
system governance “learning site” in Kilifi County to
examine various questions within the context of de-
volution in Kenya. A ‘learning site’ is an embedded ap-
proach to health policy and systems research, where
researchers and health managers in a given setting over
a long-term relationship of continuous interactions and
reflections develop specific health system governance
questions, and work towards answering them together.
HRH and EMMS were selected as tracer topics within
this study [25, 27].
Kilifi county has a population of approximately 1.2
million people and covers an area of 12,246 km2. About
74% of the population live on less than one dollar a day.
It is one of the counties in the Coastal region of Kenya
believed to have been the historical champions of devo-
lution in the country [28]. Both BT and SM are part of
the Kilifi learning site, while LG is part of sister learning
site in Cape Town, South Africa [29].
Conceptual framework
Drawing on principles from the principal-agent theory [30],
Bossert (1998) developed a decision space framework for
analysing health sector decentralisation. In his decision
space framework, Bossert described the ‘principal’ as acentral government entity with a health service delivery
mandate that it transfers to an ‘agent’, which he describes as
a peripheral entity. Bossert argued that in decentralization
policies, there is always a range of effective choices that the
‘agent’ is allowed by the ‘principal’ to make. He furthers ar-
gued that these choices though often defined within laws
and guidelines; however, the ‘actual’ choices that the ‘agent’
ends up taking often include ‘bending the law’ because of
the inability of the ‘principal’ to reinforce adherence of the
rules. It is this total range of choices that the ‘agent’ ends
up taking as outlined in the rules, and due to their ability to
‘bend the rules’ that Bossert described as decision space.
This framework has been applied in several studies of
health systems decentralization in low and middle income
countries (LMICs) [5, 18, 31, 32]. More recently, Bossert
and Mitchell (2011) have further argued that in any decen-
tralized units, decision space often interacts with and is af-
fected by organizational structure and capacity of these
units, and the accountability structures and mechanisms of
the designed decentralization system [33]. Informed by the
literature and our own study findings, we further adapted
this framework (see Fig. 1) by incorporating the broader
political context as an essential element influencing the in-
teractions between decision space, organizational structure
and capacity, and accountability mechanisms (Tsofa B,
et al.: How does decentralisation affect health sector plan-
ning and financial management? A case study of early ef-
fects of devolution in Kilifi County, Kenya, submited). We
utilized this framework to develop and structure our data
collections tools, and in this paper, we draw on this frame-
work in discussing our findings.
Data collection and analysis
As part of the learning site activities [34], we conducted
participant and non-participant observations in Kilifi
County between December 2012 and December 2014. We
also held regular quarterly reflective practice sessions
among the learning site researchers, and with local health
managers lasting between 3 and 3 hours each session [21].
We maintained field notes in form of a diary for the obser-
vations, and the reflective practice session discussions
were audio taped and transcribed. In addition, during the
same period, BT conducted non-participant observations
at the national level MoH, while at the same time system-
atically monitoring and tracking the broader national level
implementation of devolution and ongoing implementa-
tion debates, through print and electronic media, and doc-
umenting key events in a diary (Tsofa B, et al.: How does
decentralisation affect health sector planning and financial
management? A case study of early effects of devolution
in Kilifi County, Kenya, submited). We further identified
and reviewed all key documents relating to the implemen-
tation of the devolved government structure in Kenya
generally, and planned health sector implementation
Table 1 Summary of type and numbers of documents reviewed
and participants interviewed at different levels
Documents reviewed
Broader decentralization
laws/policy documents
The 2010 Constitution - 1
Transition to Devolved Government Act
2012–1
County Government Act 2012–1
Health sector specific
implementation policies
Ministry of Health Functional Analysis
and Transfer (FACT) policy - 1
The Kenya Health Policy 2013–2030 - 1
The Kenya Health Sector Strategic Plan
2013–18 - 1
Range of participants interviewed
At national level National Ministry of Health (MoH) - 3
Non-government health development
partners - 2
UN agencies representatives - 2
Commission for the Implementation of
the Constitution
The Transition Authority – 1
National Assembly Committee on Health - 1
In Kilifi county County Department of Health (CDoH)
Managers - 5
County Public Services Board - 1
County Assembly (CA) - 1
County Transition Authority coordination
office – 1
Sub-County Health Managers- 2
Fig. 1 Study conceptual framework
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were supplemented by 28 semi-structured interviews, each
lasting about 1 h, in English with a wide range of purpos-
ively selected participants (Table 1). The interview guide
covered questions on all the elements of our conceptual
framework (Fig. 1). The participants represented a wide
range of actors who had a key role in the implementation
of the devolved government, and within the health sector
specifically at the national, county and sub-county level, at
the Kilifi learning site.
BT’s previous experience in the health sector, and his
engagement with the MoH at county and national level
during the data collection phase provided him with a
unique insider perspective, with access to information
and operations of the health system both at national and
Kilifi County level that would not be accessible to purely
external researcher [35]. To strengthen objectivity in the
interpretation of his observations, regular formal reflect-
ive sessions were carried out with the other research
team members to allow for group reflections on the
findings [25].
The document review (see Table 1) provided a broader
background understanding of the goals and expectations
of the devolved government system within the Kenyan
health sector, as well as specific information on HRH and
EMMS, with information summarized using a content ex-
traction template. The interviews drew on the formal and
informal observations and discussions over a long period,
and involved discussion of both general experiences of
health sector implementation of decentralization, as well
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health commodities management.
We imported all the data into NVivo 9 software and
used the thematic framework approach for data analysis
[34]. The initial themes were guided by the elements of
our conceptual framework, which we refined as we
familiarized ourselves with the data.
Results
We present our results, first for HRH, and secondly for
EMMS. For each tracer, we begin by providing an over-
view of the organization and management of these func-
tions prior to devolution, and a summary on how they
were supposed to be organized under devolution in the-
ory (policy on paper), before turning to key issues arising
in the actual implementation process and experiences of
actors (policy in practice).
HRH management
Intended structures and implementation process for HRH
management under devolution
Before devolution, the national Public Services Commission
(PSC) served as the overall employer of all government
workers in the country, including health workers. Its role
was to provide overall guidelines and oversight for strategic
human resource development and management in the pub-
lic sector, while the routine operational human resource
management functions including recruitment, appraisal,
promotions, discipline, in-service training and payment of
salaries were delegated to the respective government minis-
tries, including the national MoH for all health workers.
Under the devolved government system, the PSC is
mandated to provide employment for national govern-
ment employees, and oversight of the entire public ser-
vice both at national and county level. At the county
level, the constitution provided for the establishment of
County Public Service Boards (CPSBs) in each county
that would serve as the overall employer of all public
servants in that county.
Public servants performing devolved functions at the
time of the general elections on March 2013 were to be
seconded to the county governments where they are
working, to be formerly deployed or transferred to those
county governments once the county human resource
management structures were established. Within the
health sector, national MoH in liaison with the constitu-
tionally established Transition Authority was to under-
take a human resource capacity assessment for the
counties (Tsofa B, et al.: How does decentralisation affect
health sector planning and financial management? A
case study of early effects of devolution in Kilifi County,
Kenya, submited). The Transition Authority was to fur-
ther work to build capacity for all CPSBs to enable them
to undertake the assigned pubic service managementfunction, and then work with respective ministries to
transfer all staff working in the counties from the na-
tional government to the respective CPSBs.Implementation experiences and outcomes of HRH
management under devolution
Lack of clarity over HRH management roles at
county level Beyond overall responsibility for the man-
agement of county government employees, it was un-
clear what specific operational human resource
management responsibilities the CPSB would have for
the respective technical county departments, leading to
a lack of clarity over HRH management responsibility
between the CPSB and the County Department of
Health (CDoH). There was also lack of clarity over
which structures and institutions at national and county
level would be responsible for specific welfare aspects of
health workers, including in-service training and career
progression; and how inter-county transfers for health
workers would be managed. Some of these confusions
were expressed during the interviews:
…Things were not also very clear with this human
resource management issue; it’s not clear who is to
undertake what role…. KII SC 005…Now the movement is still not very clear to us
with, I mean now outside the county. So today we
had a meeting with the director but we didn’t discuss
it, we just talked about the persons who want to be
moved within the county but the question of
movement outside the county remained un-answered….
KII SC 002Rushed transfer, dialogue and interim arrangements
for HRH management Given the rushed transfer of de-
volved functions, and the challenges this brought for
HRH management in counties at the time, several health
sector stakeholders at national level came together to
dialogue on these HRH management challenges. To
avert a crisis of counties failing to pay salaries for health
workers countrywide due to lack of capacity to under-
take payroll management, the national health sector
Intergovernmental Relations Forum that brings together
the national MoH with the 47 CDoHs, was convened to
develop an interim solution. It was agreed that for an in-
terim period of 6 months the national MoH would con-
tinue processing and paying salaries for all health
workers on behalf of the counties, then invoice the
county governments for reimbursements. It was ex-
pected that counties would take the 6 months’ interim
period to set up their systems, leading to them taking up
the role of health worker salary payments.
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government, was anti-devolution and to be seen not
to be anti-devolution we said yes, these services must
be transferred (immediately) and that is it. The func-
tions were transferred….] KII N 002…..…..through you know negotiations with county
governments, I think they accepted that national
government would continue paying salaries of county
workers in the interim up to December 2013 as they
prepare themselves…] KII N 001……
Disruptions, delays, and discrepancies in health
workers’ salaries County governments went ahead to
prepare their payroll management systems in readiness
for undertaking the role of paying salaries for health care
workers by January 2014. However, when they eventually
took up this role the initial months were characterized
by several challenges including general delays in salary
payments, payroll discrepancies and missing allowances;
and some staff missing from the payroll altogether.
Public participation and accountability in recruit-
ment of senior public servants The constitution pro-
vided an opportunity for public participation in the
appointment of senior public servants including Cabinet
Secretaries and Principal Secretaries of ministries at na-
tional level, and County Executive Committee (CEC)
members and Chief Officers of departments at county
level. The president (at the national level) and governors
(at county level) nominated individuals for appointment
into these positions. The nominated individuals’ names
were then submitted to the National and County Assem-
bly committees respectively, for a public vetting exercise.
Members of the public were invited to present their
views in the form of memoranda to the vetting commit-
tee, in support of or in contest of the appointment of
the nominees. The nominees where then appointed after
clearance by the vetting committees. However, at both
national and county level, this was seen by many as a
public relations exercise as many people felt that mem-
bers of both the National and County Assemblies did
not have the required skills and capacity to undertake
meaningful assessment and vetting for these public offi-
cers. Secondly there were strong perceptions that both
the National and County Assemblies were regularly
compromised by their respective executive arms of gov-
ernment, through allowances and other inducements to
‘rubber stamp’ executive decisions and choices.
…. public participation is very weak, very weak; because
when you bring a bill, you bring them (Members of the
County Assembly) here to take them through … you
invite the committee to take them through the Bill. Paythem a sitting allowance; When they get it there at the
assembly, they will not raise a finger on it…. KII C 002
Political interference and discrimination in HRH
management Political interference and discrimination
in HRH management began to be reported in some
counties immediately the devolution process began. One
national level interviewee highlighted an example where
in mid-2013, the national MoH deployed to counties a
group of freshly qualified medical doctors who had com-
pleted a one-year statutory government internship train-
ing as required by law. It was however reported that
some of the counties rejected the doctors sent to them
because they had come from different tribes or counties
from the ones they were posted to.
…It’s tricky, because that has happened in the health
sector few weeks ago, Dr. XXX posted out some
doctors who had either finished training or internship
and some counties rejected them claiming they didn’t
come from those counties…. KII N 007
Political interference with health workers was also re-
ported at facility level. During one reflective practice ses-
sion with sub-county managers, it was reported that one
dispensary within a Kilifi sub-county had been closed
because community members led by their Area Member
of County Assembly had demanded to have the only
nurse at the dispensary transferred because she did not
come from the local tribe. Sub-county level interviewees
reported that this growing level of political interference
and victimization raised significant concerns among
health workers.
The fear for political interference and victimization,
coupled with uncertainty over inter-county transfers, led
to many health workers wanting to be transferred back
to their ‘home-counties’.
…. up to August last year, there had been so many
transfers. People were requesting to move away to go
back to their home counties people were in state of
panic not sure about how their host counties would
treat them so they wanted to go back to their
homes…. KII C 008
Fears, anxiety, low morale and industrial actions by
health workers The multiple challenges and uncertainties
over health workforce management highlighted above led
to wide-spread fear and anxiety among many health care
workers at the time. The concerns included the uncer-
tainty about career progression, uncertainty about inter-
county transfers, the increasing political interference over
health worker management, and the continued disrup-
tions in salary payments. Owing to these issues, the
Fig. 2 Media coverage of the 2013 health workers strike in Kenya
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resignations of health workers countrywide. In late
2013 the three major health worker unions in the coun-
try called for a nation-wide strike citing these chal-
lenges and pressing for re-centralization of the health
service delivery function back to national government.
During this strike, which lasted for several weeks,
health care workers countrywide resorted to several
protest strategies including street demonstrations and
social media protests (Fig. 2).
In response to this strike action, the Council of
Governors met in Nairobi and took a joint political de-
cision to lay off all striking health workers within their
counties. Several counties went ahead to sack all the
striking health workers, and re-advertised their posi-
tions. This action by county governments, together
with the realization by health workers that they could
not negotiate for a return to work arrangement cen-
trally, but instead had to do so with respective county
governments, softened the position and stand of the
health worker unions prompting them to call off the
strike in early 2014.EMMS management
Intended structures and implementation process for EMMS
management under devolution
Prior to the roll-out of devolution the Kenya Medical
Supplies Agency (KEMSA) - a state corporation under
the national MoH - had the statutory mandate for pro-
curement, warehousing and distribution of all EMMS
to all government health facilities. In partnership with
KEMSA, the national MoH employed a ‘pull’ system for
EMMS management and supply for public health faci-
lities where the national MoH would allocate a quota of
its annual budget for EMMS to KEMSA. This allo-
cation would then be subdivided between all gazetted
government health facilities based on a resource alloca-
tion criteria developed by the national MoH. Using the
facility allocation, KEMSA would then establish an ac-
count for each facility known as ‘drawing rights’ to
cover each financial year. Health facilities would then
make orders (‘pull’) from their drawing rights at
KEMSA on a quarterly basis and KEMSA would service
the facility orders while crediting the facility allocation.
However, this pre-devolution pull system faced
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ported prolonged delays in servicing their quarterly or-
ders by KEMSA, and very low refill rates, leading to
long periods without essential supplies.
Under devolution, county governments would be the
ones to allocate resources for and procure EMMS for
government health facilities within their areas. Given the
many years of perceived inefficiency in KEMSA, county
health managers welcomed these proposals, anticipating
that this would give counties greater bargaining power
to demand for more efficient supply service from
KEMSA. They also felt that if KEMSA was unable to
meet their needs, they would be in control and able to
decide to out-source through alternative suppliers.
…. I would say devolution is a good thing because
we’ve consistently been complaining about KEMSA
and now that we have this is actual money. It’s no
longer drawing a virtual imaginary figure. This is
actual money, then we expect better supply, we
expect better supplies for our facilities in terms of
quantities and in terms of variety of the medicines…
most of the items from KEMSA we will procure from
them, then what is not available at KEMSA especially
for the hospitals, we’ve asked them to prepare a
separate list and for that we will float a quotation……
KII C 004
The process of EMMS management under devolution
begins from the health facility level, where the health
worker in-charge undertakes needs quantification and
submits projected facility requirements to the County
Pharmacist. At the county level, the County Pharma-
cist is responsible for providing technical assistance
to facility managers on quantifications. The County
Pharmacist then analyses and consolidates the orders
from health facilities, prepares purchase orders and
submits them to the County Treasury. The procure-
ment department at the County Treasury is charged
with the responsibility for the tendering process for
the required commodities.
Community involvement and participation in EMMS
management is supposed to occur at several levels. First
during the priority setting, planning and budgeting
process health facility managers are supposed to con-
sult with the health Facility Management Committees
(FMCs) made up of community representatives from
within the facility catchment area. The facility in-
charge is further supposed to consult with the FMCs
during the commodity quantification and ordering
process. Finally, once the orders have been supplied,
the FMCs should be involved in ascertaining that the
right orders have been delivered before payments are
made to suppliers.……community involvement especially with the new
dispensation, it is very important. We have to sensitize
our communities even when the commodities are
supplied to the facilities, they should be told that we
have received this consignment and in this quantity
……. delivery notes have to be signed by 3 people, the
facility in-charge, the facility committee chairperson
and another person from the facility management
committee … KII C 004
Implementation experiences and outcomes of EMMS
management under devolution
Dialogue, consensus building and interim arrange-
ments In the early days of implementation of the de-
volved governments, a health sector Intergovernmental
Relations Forum was convened to facilitate dialogue and
consensus around EMMS management issues and to de-
velop an interim action plan to address a drug shortage
crisis that was at the time being experienced in govern-
ment health facilities across the country. During this dia-
logue process, the national MoH with support from
health sector development partners, provided funds to
procure a 6 months’ commodities starter stock for all
government health facilities countrywide. This was done
to allow the county government to set up their struc-
tures and systems to take up this procurement role.
In addition, following negotiation, an agreement was
reached for all counties to make KEMSA the first
point of call for their health commodity needs, to gain
economies of scale and commodity quality assurance.
The counties and KEMSA agreed on a ‘service agree-
ment’ where KEMSA would service the orders from
counties within 2 weeks of receiving them, and coun-
ties would pay for these commodities upon delivery by
KEMSA.
Procurement and distribution process of commo-
dities in Kilifi County The CDoH in Kilifi embarked
on the quantification and ordering process for EMMS
from the end of 2013 amidst several challenges, includ-
ing a lack of appropriate technical and infrastructural
capacity at facility and county level. Eventually, the first
consignment of hospital supplies procured by the county
were delivered in February 2014. Though the supplies to
lower level facilities were slightly delayed, when they
eventually arrived there was a feeling by facility man-
agers that the order servicing by KEMSA has improved
compared to pre-devolution.
…They (KEMSA) have now supplied so generally we
are not badly off as a hospital. the refill rate was almost
to 95%. We did the quantifications that this is what we
want and then we raised an LPO and they supplied
most of the things we needed……. KII SC 003
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all operational public health facilities within the county,
irrespective of their legal registration status. This was
different from the old ‘pull system’ where only facilities
which had been gazetted were allocated drawing rights
for commodities by KEMSA. Considering that the
gazettement of health facilities used to be undertaken
by the national MoH, and could take several years from
the time a facility was operational, health facilities often
operated without drawing rights allocations for drugs
and other commodities.
As the counties took up the EMMS management func-
tion, there was a visible attempt by several county poli-
tical leaders countrywide to achieve political visibility
over this role. First several counties in their initial days
opted to procure ambulances which were perceived to
be politically more visible in the eyes of the public and
voters, at the expense of procuring essential drugs for
their health facilities. This ambulance procurement
‘craze’ by many counties was extensively covered by the
national media at the time. Subsequently, when the
counties begun to procure drugs, it became increasingly
fashionable for governors to organize public rallies everyFig. 3 Images of the Kilifi County Governor flagging off drug distribution; atime the KEMSA trucks carrying drugs for health faci-
lities arrived, with a claim of officially ‘flagging off ’ the
drug supply. This turned what used to be a routine exer-
cise of drug distribution to health facilities into a major
political fun-fair in the counties under devolution.
Figure 3 is a collection of images illustrating the politi-
cisation of EMMS management in Kilifi County.
Discussion
Omar [4] argued that the political drivers and context
that push a country to adopting decentralized govern-
ance arrangements have a major bearing on how
decentralization gets implemented in that setting [4].
From our findings, the political context in Kenya
caused the transfer of devolved health sector functions
to be done faster than had been anticipated by most
health sector players (Tsofa B, et al.: How does decen-
tralisation affect health sector planning and financial
management? A case study of early effects of devolution
in Kilifi County, Kenya, submited) [25]. This happened
at a time when the county governments had not set up
their organizational structures and built capacity for
these structures to undertake their functions, causingnd the Kilifi County ambulances
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delivery. In this paper, we have specifically illustrated
how this rapid transfer of functions caused major chal-
lenges in the management of HRH, and EMMS at
county level.
On HRH management, the rapid transfer of functions
before counties had established their HRH management
structures meant that they could not undertake key
HRH management roles, including payroll management
and payment of salaries. However, an interim arrange-
ment was agreed, where national MoH continued to pay
staff salaries up to December 2013, and invoiced county
governments for reimbursements. When the counties
eventually took up this role, payment of staff salaries
was often delayed, with numerous pay-roll inconsisten-
cies and discrepancies and some staff totally missing
from the payroll. There were also some reported cases of
political interference in HRH management across the
country. Other challenges included a lack of clarity over
key HRH management roles by different players, includ-
ing management of inter-county transfers, in-service
training and career progression for health care workers.
These challenges led to observed and reported fear, anx-
iety, and mass resignations of health care workers across
the country; and eventually culminated into a protracted
health workers’ strike that crippled the health sector
country-wide for several weeks in late 2013.
Similarly, the EMMS management function was af-
fected by the rapid transfer of responsibilities. In the
early days after devolution, there were arguments and
contestations between national MoH and CDoH
country-wide on the role of KEMSA. In the interim
phase, national MoH, with funding from donors, sup-
plied 6 months’ worth of buffer stock of drugs for all
public health care facilities countrywide as a stop-gap
measure to allow for counties to set up their procure-
ment and distribution systems. When the county gov-
ernments eventually took up this role, there was
widespread politicization of the drugs and commodities
procurement and distribution within the health sector.Table 2 Shifting county level decision space over HRH and EMMS m
organizational structure and capacity of overtime
Function County level decis
prior to July 2013
HRH Management
Employment of staff +
Deployment/distribution of staff +
Payment of salaries +
EMMS Management
Commodity quantification +
Commodity procurement +
Commodity allocation/distribution to health facilities +Nevertheless, health facilities reported better fill rates
whenever drugs were supplied.
Though our findings show that the implementation of
the devolved government system in Kenya significantly
increased the decision space for HRH and EMMS man-
agement at county level, the ability of counties to claim,
and utilize this space was undermined by an initial lack
of proper structures and capacity to fully undertake all
the HRH and EMMS management functions. However,
with time as counties established their structures and
built their capacity they did increase their ability to
utilize the expanded decision space over these roles.
Table 2 below illustrates our analysis of the the shifting
county level health sector decision space over HRH and
EMMS management functions over time. This happened
in response over time during that period with the pro-
gressive building of organizational structure and cap-
acity at county level. From these findings, it is evident
that decision space of decentralized units can be com-
promised by lack of capacity to undertake the decentra-
lized functions.
In a study of health sector decentralization in Pakistan,
Bossert and Mitchell (2011) reported that the de facto
decision space over decentralized health sector manage-
ment functions was always different from the de jure
decision space; and that the difference was often due to
the capacity of the individuals and institutions tasked to
undertake the decentralized functions. Our findings
agree with those of Bossert and Mitchell. They highlight
the importance of ensuring that appropriate peripheral
level capacity to undertake decentralized functions, is in
place in decentralized units if the benefits of health sec-
tor decentralization are to be realized (Tsofa B, et al.:
How does decentralisation affect health sector planning
and financial management? A case study of early effects
of devolution in Kilifi County, Kenya, submited) [33]. In
addition, our findings also highlight the need to be ready
to develop interim measures when this capacity is not
yet available, and for central government and develop-
ment partners to support this. The findings alsoanagement functions corresponding to improvement in
ion space County level decision Space
July – Dec 2013
County level decision space
after December 2013
++++ ++++
++++ ++++
+ ++++
++ ++++
++ ++++
++ ++++
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ent HRH and EMMS management functions across the
different levels.
In our analysis, we note that the increase over time of
county level decision space over HRH and EMMS man-
agement functions led to several positive effects. For
HRH, the county gained the ability to determine the ac-
tual number of staff based on its budget and decide
where to deploy them within the county. For EMMS,
decentralized procurement led to a reported better fill-
rate in health facilities, and the county was able to en-
sure all facilities were supplied with EMMS irrespective
of registration status. This in turn allowed previously
non-functioning facilities to operate, and thus previously
underserved areas to have access to a facility. It is there-
fore likely that increased decision space at county level
enhanced local level equity in the allocation of health re-
sources, and health service provision at county level, and
ensured services reached previously underserved
populations.
However, the increase in county level decision space
also led to perverse negative effects. With regards to
HRH management, for example, the transfer to counties
of decisions over the number and type of health work-
force led to complications over transfers to other coun-
ties. In addition, the increase in county level decision
space led to political interference over recruitment and
deployment of staff, as local politicians began to demand
that only health workers from within their county and
tribe should be employed within the county. Political
interference over HRH management within decentra-
lized settings has also been reported in the Philippines
by Grundy et al. (2003) [11]. Though not reported in
our study, decentralized HRH recruitment has also been
associated with inability to attract highly skilled health
workers in rural remote areas in rural districts in
Uganda [12]. Though our study was conducted in the
early days of devolution implementation, this challenge
may be less likely to occur in Kenya as the counties have
more decision space for HRH management than their
Ugandan counterparts, including the power to create
special incentives to attract and retain staff.
For EMMS, as reported in Ghana and Guatemala [10],
it could be argued that decentralized procurement led to
the loss of economies of scale associated with a central-
ized procurement system. The increased decision space
over EMMS management also fueled county level
prioritization of the procurement of highly visible com-
modities such as ambulances at the expense of much
needed drugs for Primary Health Care services (PHC).
These observations are consistent with those made in
Uganda and South Africa, where decentralized units pri-
oritized allocations to curative services at the expense of
PHC, as the former were more visible to the community[36–38]. This might be expected given the political na-
ture of decentralization, leading local level political deci-
sion makers to prioritize issues that are more politically
visible, and which will resonate with the electorate in
order to maintain political support [39].
In relation to accountability structures and practices
our study also found that these influenced decision
space among health sector actors. For HRH, for ex-
ample, we found that senior managers of the county
government, including the County Department of
Health, had to undergo public vetting at the County As-
sembly for their suitability for office, before being
appointed. Similarly, we found that that the health facil-
ity managers had to involve their respective FMCs in the
EMMS quantification process, and later inform them
once the supplies are received at the facility. In both
these cases, we find that the devolved government sys-
tem was deliberately designed with increased public par-
ticipation and accountability mechanisms with an
intention to guard against potential decision space ex-
cesses by management decision makers. In addition to
being an accountability mechanisms, enhanced public
participation, especially in health resources allocation
also does enhance community responsiveness of health
service prioritization and thus promoting equity [22, 40].
In general, a recurring theme in the early days of Ken-
yan devolution affecting the design of the devolved gov-
ernment systems, the transfer process of county level
functions generally, and the early effects on HRH and
EMMS management process, was the politicization of
the process. This observation underscores the arguments
that by the mere fact that it involves the shifting of
power and control from the center to the periphery,
decentralization is a highly political process in its own
right, and any attempt to analyse health sector effects of
decentralization policies should always include an ana-
lysis of the political context [4, 7].
Study strengths and limitations
The primary focus on only one county out of the 47 in
the country could be considered a limitation of this
study. However, the decision to use one county was de-
liberate, as it allowed for a deeper exploration of the is-
sues under focus, by involving extended engagement
with a broad range of stakeholders. Kilifi County is also
part of the health systems governance learning sites for
the Resilient and Responsive Health Systems (RESYST)
consortium [21, 27]. This allows for longer-term tracking
of the decentralization effects in this sites beyond the
time of this study. The learning site setting also provided
an opportunity for regular feedback to the county man-
agers and national MoH thus increasing the potential of
this study to inform the progressive implementation of
devolution in the county and country.
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Decentralization has been an important element of the
health system governance reform agenda for many years
owing to its perceived importance in creating opportun-
ities for strengthening local level management efficiency
over ever-scarce health sector resources. For these rea-
son, many health systems decentralization initiatives
have included the goal of increasing local level decision
space over management or resources.
The implementation of a devolved government system
in Kenya has significantly increased county level decision
space over HRH and EMMS management. This in-
creased decision space created great potential in allow-
ing for targeted recruitment and deployment of health
workers, and procurement and distribution of EMMS
based on local level priority needs. However, in practice
this potential was undermined by organizational struc-
ture and capacity limitations, particularly in the early
stages of implementation. Political interference also
played a key role over HRH and EMMS management at
county level, and was exacerbated by the combination of
increased decision-space at sub-national levels at a time
when structures and systems were not in place, and cap-
acity was inadequate. That political interference was evi-
dent is hardly surprising, given that devolution itself is
highly political, involving the transfer of power over
management of public resources from national to sub-
national levels of government.Recomendations
With these findings, we recommend the need for spe-
cific interventions to strengthen county level capacity
over specific HRH and EMMS management functions so
as to harness the potential positive effects of the in-
creased decision space at county level brought about by
the devolved government system in Kenya. These inter-
ventions should include creating clarity over HRH man-
agement roles between the CDoH and the CPSB, and
improving the county payroll management system to
stabilize payment of salaries for health care workers. On
EMMS, there is need for strengthening the capacity of
both health facility managers and CDoH managers in
undertaking specifications and quantification of EMMS
in order to streamline and speed up the ordering and
procurement processes to avoid long periods of stock
outs. At a national level, there is need for all stake-
holders to come together to deliberate and build consen-
sus on how certain HRH management roles including
in-service training and inter-county transfers should be
conducted across the country. For LMICs with similar
settings to Kenya, we recommend that individual and in-
stitutional capacity considerations should always made
when allocating functions between the center and theperiphery during the design and implementation of
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